Towards Multidimensional Verification: Where Functional Meets
  Non-Functional by Jenihhin, Maksim et al.
© 2018 IEEE.  Personal use of this material is permitted.  Permission from IEEE must be obtained for 
all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for 
advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to 
servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. 
 Towards Multidimensional Verification:  
Where Functional Meets Non-Functional 
Maksim Jenihhin, Xinhui Lai, Tara Ghasempouri, Jaan Raik 
Computer Systems, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia, maksim@ati.ttu.ee 
 
Abstract— Trends in advanced electronic systems’ design 
have a notable impact on design verification technologies. The 
recent paradigms of Internet-of-Things (IoT) and Cyber-
Physical Systems (CPS) assume devices immersed in physical 
environments, significantly constrained in resources and 
expected to provide levels of security, privacy, reliability, 
performance and low power features. In recent years, numerous 
extra-functional aspects of electronic systems were brought to 
the front and imply verification of hardware design models in 
multidimensional space along with the functional concerns of 
the target system. However, different from the software domain 
such a holistic approach remains underdeveloped. The 
contributions of this paper are a taxonomy for multidimensional 
hardware verification aspects, a state-of-the-art survey of 
related research works and trends towards the 
multidimensional verification concept. The concept is motivated 
by an example for the functional and power verification 
dimensions. 
Keywords— extra-functional verification; functional 
verification; survey; taxonomy; security verification; reliability 
verification; power verification; timing verification. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Today, several prominent trends in electronic systems 
design can be observed. The Internet-of-Things (IoT) and 
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) devices are immersed in 
physical environments, significantly constrained in resources 
and expected to provide levels of security and privacy [1], 
ultra-low power feature or high performance. Very complex 
electronic systems, including those built from the non-
certified for reliability Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) 
components, are used for safety- and business-critical 
applications. These trends along with gigascale integration at 
nanoscale technology nodes and multi-/many-processor based 
systems-on-chip architectures have ultimately brought to the 
front various extra-functional aspects of the electronic 
systems’ design at the chip design level. The latter include 
security, reliability, timing, power consumption etc. There 
exist numerous threats causing an electronic system to violate 
its specification. In the hardware part, these are design errors 
(bugs), manufacturing defects and variations, reliability issues 
such as soft errors and aging faults or malicious faults, such as 
security attacks. Eventually, there can also be bugs in the 
software part.   
Hardware design model verification detects design errors 
affecting functional and extra-functional (also 
interchangeably referred as non-functional) aspects of the 
target electronic system. Strictly, the sole task of extra-
functional verification of a design model is limited to detecting 
deviations that cause violation of extra-functional 
requirements. In practice, it often intersects with the task of 
functional verification [2], [14], thus establishing a 
multidimensional space for verification. A “grey area” in 
distinction between functional and extra-functional 
requirements may appear when an extra-functional 
requirement is a part of design’s main functionality. E.g., 
security requirements for some HW design can be split into 
extra-functional and functional sets if the design’s purpose and 
specified functionality is a system’s security aspect, e.g. it is a 
secure cryptoprocessor.  
In this paper, we present an overview for the recent trends 
in extra-functional and functional verification of HW designs 
and discuss the challenges towards the holistic 
multidimensional verification. The rest of this paper is 
organized as follows: Section II provides a taxonomy of 
multidimensional verification aspects, Sections III proposes a 
state-of-the-art survey with the key trends in verification for 
the main extra-functional aspects, Section IV discusses the 
multidimensional verification paradigm and presents a 
motivational example for the functional and power 
verification dimensions, Section V draws the conclusions.  
II. TAXONOMY OF MULTIDIMENSIONAL VERIFICATION 
ASPECTS 
In practice, relevance of each functional and extra-
functional aspect strongly depends on design type, target 
system application and specific user requirements. Following 
the design paradigm shift, a number of extra-functional 
aspects have recently received significant academic research 
attention e.g., security. At the same time, there already exist 
established industrial practices for measuring and maintaining 
separate design qualities, e.g. the RAS (Reliability-
Availability-Serviceability) aspect introduced by IBM [6]. 
While in the software engineering discipline, the taxonomy of 
extra-functional requirements has a comprehensive coverage 
by the literature [7]-[12], it cannot be directly re-used for the 
HW verification discipline because of significant difference in 
the design models.  
Fig 1 introduces a taxonomy of multidimensional 
verification aspects derived from the performed literature 
review. The conventional functional concerns are safety and 
liveness properties, combinational and temporal 
dependencies along with data types, however this list can be 
extended for particular designs. The extra-functional aspects 
can be strictly categorized into three groups: system qualities, 
system resource constraints and timing aspects (in bold). 
Despite the security and reliability aspects belong to the first 
group and the power aspect belongs to the second group, these 
three aspects have a special attention in the literature and in 
practical applications.  Several extra-functional aspects such 
as (manufacturing defects) testability, fault-tolerance and 
other in-field fault group aspects do not have a direct 
correspondence in the software engineering discipline because 
of the distinct nature of faults. Other aspects such as real-time 
constraints are very similar between the two domains.  
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 III. TRENDS IN EXTRA-FUNCTIONAL VERIFICATION 
Table I presents a survey of recent publications targeting 
extra-functional and multidimensional verification. Here, 
along with the specific extra-functional aspects details about 
the design model and verification approach are outlined, i.e., 
the design under verification type, verification engine, the 
level of abstraction, design representation language, compute 
model and the tool operated in the research. For instance, the 
row for paper [40] shows that the authors performed model 
checking to reduce the state space of a Timed Petri Net of a 
real-time scheduler. Looking at this row, real-time constraints 
is the type of timing property, a scheduler of an embedded 
system is the design under verification, the abstraction level is 
the system level and SMT model checker Promela [64], Timed 
Petri Net and SPIN [63] are the verification engine, the design 
representation language, the compute model and the tool, 
respectively. We pointed out such key points for all the recent 
up to 10-year old studies in this area. 
A. Security aspects 
Security is difficult to quantify as today there are no 
commonly agreed metrics for this purpose [1]. The key 
targeted security services [16] are commonly represented as 
non-functional aspects for verification are confidentiality, 
integrity and availability. They are tightly linked to the type of 
attack and the attacker model assumed for each case, i.e. 
black-, grey- or white-box.  
Today, for complex HW designs (e.g. IEEE1687 
Reconfigurable Scan Networks or NoCs) the specific on-chip 
security features in the design model to be verified also tend 
to be very sophisticated. These include on-chip mechanisms 
for attack prevention (firewalls, user management, 
communications isolation), attack protection (traffic 
scrambling, encryption) and attack resilience (checkers for 
side-channel attacks, covert channel detection, attack recovery 
mechanisms). 
Many of the existing works in security verification (e.g. 
[21], [23], [25], [28], [29]) are focusing on the integrity 
attribute, mostly addressing HW trojan detection . There also 
exist some works that additionally target ([19], [20], [22], [24], 
[30]) or are exclusively considering ([26], [27]) the 
confidentiality aspect.  
Several solutions in security verification are restricted to 
target specific architectures or types of modules such as 
Reconfigurable Scan Networks (RSNs) [22], [26] or macro-
asynchronous micro-synchronous pipelines [29]. 
There is virtually no work that considers security in 
combination with other extra-functional aspects. Some 
solutions in the security verification of NoCs indirectly 
address reliability due to the fact that they implement 
hardware monitors that allow avoiding both, attacks and in-
field faults [20], [21]. An approach that is designed for 
modeling a multitude of extra-functional aspects is the model-
based engineering example of Architecture Analysis and 
Design Language (AADL) [19]. While, in principle, AADL 
allows representing several extra-functional aspects (called 
quality attributes in AADL), [19] only concentrates on 
analysis of confidentiality as a part of verifying security in a 
system with multiple levels of security. The authors in [70] 
have target a general multi-view HW modeling and 
verification approach taking into consideration  the security 
view.    
B. Reliability aspects 
The key drivers for the reliability aspect in today’s designs 
are the recent industrial standards in different application 
domains such as IEC61508, ISO26262, IEC61511, IEC62279, 
IEC62061, RTCA/DO-254, IEC60601, etc. These ultimately 
imply extra-functional features such as safety mechanisms and 
redundancy to ensure levels of fault coverage, e.g. ASIL 
(Automotive Safety Integrity Level). Here, the key threats are 
transient faults in the field such as radiation-induced single 
event effects or soft errors [15] and intermittent to permanent 
faults by process or time-dependent variations, i.e. aging, e.g. 
induced by Bias Temperature Instability (BTI) [13]. New 
applications, demand the systems to be fail-safe or fail-
operational, by functionally redundant design parts enabling 
fault-tolerance, -resilience and -robustness. A promising 
initiative in reliability specification and modelling is the 
Reliability Information Interchange Format (RIIF) [30].  
Fig. 1. Taxonomy of multidimensional verification aspects 
 Similar to other aspects, reliability in large complex 
electronic systems, e.g. safety-critical CPSs is tackled starting 
at high level of abstraction. System’s fault tolerance is 
formally checked using UPPAAL and timed automata models 
generated from AADL specifications [33]. HW design models 
and tools at such a level also enable verification of interference 
of extra-functional design aspects [70].  
There are research works relying on design soft-error 
reliability verification by fault-injection campaigns e.g. [69] 
or formal analysis [68]. This analysis is targeted at extra-
TABLE I. SURVEY OF THE STATE-OF-THE-ART SOLUTIONS FOR EXTRA-FUNCTIONAL AND MULTIDIMENSIONAL VERIFICATION
Paper Year1 
Extra-functional aspect2 
Design under 
verification 
Verification 
engine 
Abstract. 
level5 
Design 
representation 
language 
Compute  
model Tool Security Reliability3 Timing4 Power Other system quality 
Other 
constrained 
resource
[19] 2009 confidentiality, integrity - - - - - HW/SW system
formal, 
correct-by-
construction
SL AADL - OSATE 
[20] 2016 integrity, confidentiality ○ - - - - NoC 
simulation, 
HW 
monitors
RTL VHDL/Verilog - - 
[21] 2014 integrity ○ - - - - NoC formal GL VHDL/Verilog - SurfNoC
[22] 2017 integrity, confidentiality - - - - - RSN model check RTL ICL 
Craig 
interpolation CIP solver 
[23] 2015 integrity - - - - - SoC simulation RTL VHDL/Verilog - -
[24] 2016 integrity, confidentiality - - - - - ALU 
equivalence 
check GL - QBF-SAT - 
[25] 2017 integrity - - - - - SoC semiformal GL - - JasperGold SPV
[26] 2016 confidentiality - - - - - RSN model check RTL ICL Craig interpolation CIP Solver 
[27] 2017 confidentiality - - - - - industrial control systems formal SL ASLan++ - CL-AtSe 
[28] 2017 integrity - - - - - IP cores semiformal GL VHDL - mini-SAT
[29] 2015 integrity - - - - - ISA, pipeline model check RTL - CTL, LTL nuXmv SMV
[30],[71] 2013 integrity, confidentiality - - - - - IPs and SoCs formal RTL, GL Verilog - 
JasperGold 
SPV 
[33] 2017 - ● - - - - CPS model check SL AADL Timed Automata UPPAAL 
[34] 2015 - SER - - - - IP cores formal GL/RTL LDDL LDDL Coq
[35] 2010 - SER - - availability, serviceability - processor fault inject. GL Verilog - IBM in-house
[36] 2016 - ● - - availability, serviceability - SoC fault inject. RTL - - - 
[38] 2018 - - latency ○ - - NoC fault inject. RTL VHDL - QoSinNoC
[39] 2011 - - RT - - - memory model check RTL REAL;AADL - Ocarina
[40] 2010 - - RT - - - Scheduler of a RT emb. system model check - Promela  
Time Petri-
net SPIN 
[41] 2010 - - latency - - - RT emb. system model check SL AADL - YICES
[42] 2017 - - performance ○ - - NoC, HW/SW architectures simulation SL 
GAL (Graph 
Assembly 
Language) 
resource / 
connectivity 
graphs
ArchOn 
[43],[44] 2016 - ○ (LTR) - ○ - thermal Smart Systems simulation SL IP-XACT; SystemC-AMS - - 
[46] 2012    ● - - IPs simulation SL SystemC - -
[47] 2016    ● - - DSP cores simulation SL,GL,RTL SystemC - Powersim
[50] 2017 - - performance ○ - - automotive CPS model check SL C, EAST-ADL Timed Automata UPPAALsdv
[51] 2016 - - - ● - - IPs semiformalABV RTL 
VHDL/Verilog;
SystemC 
Hidden 
Markov 
Model
- 
[52] 2012 - - execution time ○ - - 
distributed emb. 
system simulation SL SystemC - - 
[53] 2016 - - performance ○ - thermal HW/SW platform 
simulation, 
formal 
(analytical)
RTL,TLM,SL 
UML;  C++; 
SystemC-AMS; 
VHDL 
HIF HIFSuite 
[54] 2014 - - - - connectivity - SoC 
symbolic 
model 
checking
RTL/TLM Verilog - 
Incisive 
Formal 
Verifier
[55] 2008 - - ○ (latencies) - connectivity - SoC property checking RTL Verilog - 
JasperGold 
CV
[56] 2016 - - - - - memory consistency processor simulation ISA ruby - McVerSi 
[60] 2011 - - - ● - thermal SoC simulation SL, GL/RTL SystemC - 
PowerMixer,
PowerDepot,
PowerBrick,
[61] 2015 - - - ● - -  simulation SL,TLM SytemC - Power Kernel Tool
[62] 2011 - - - ● - - SoC simulation SL SystemC - Powersim 
[67] 2018 - ● - - - - CPS 
formal and 
simulation, 
HW 
monitors
RTL VHDL/Verilog multiple multiple 
[68] 2014 - SER - - - - IPs SAT solver RTL VHDL - - 
[69] 2010 - SER - - - - IPs, processor simulation RTL VHDL/Verilog - - 
[70] 2018 ● ● - - - - MPSoC model check SL, RTL - Timed Automata UPPAAL 
1 only conference, journal and industrial white papers published in the last 10 years were selected for this survey 
2 ● – this aspect is the main focus in the paper; ○ – this aspect is partially addressed 
3 LTR – lifetime reliability; SER – soft-error reliability;  
4 RT – real-time constraints; 
5 GL – gate level; SL – system level; ISA – instruction set architecture level; TLM – transaction level model 
 functional structures for error protection, e.g. error-correction 
code (ECC) based mechanisms against single-bit errors in 
memory elements [68]. [34] proposes a general approach to 
verify gate-level design transformations for reliability against 
single-event transients by soft errors that combines formal 
reasoning on execution traces. [35] and [36] focus on the RAS 
(reliability, availability and serviceability) group of extra-
functional aspects outlined by IBM for complex processor 
designs where embedded error protection mechanisms and 
designs intrinsic immunity (due to various masking) to errors 
is evaluated by fault injection.  
[43] and [44] propose extensions to system descriptions in 
the IP-EXACT format to enable multi-layer representation 
and simulation of several mutually influencing extra-
functional aspects of smart system designs such as lifetime 
reliability (aging), power and temperature. A complex 
approach to verification of multiple reliability concerns (soft 
errors, BTI, etc.) across layers in industrial CPS designs is 
proposed in [67] as a collaborative research result in the 
IMMORAL project.  
C. Timing aspects 
Functional temporal properties are essential part of 
sequential designs’ specification that are often modelled for 
functional verification by computational tree logic (CTL), 
applied for formal approaches, and linear temporal logic (LTL) 
temporal assertions expressed arbitrarily in PSL (Property 
Specification Language), SVA (System Verilog Assertions) or 
systematically in UVM (Universal Verification Methodology). 
In the extra-functional domain, these can be extended to 
specific requirements about performance (in particular as a 
trade-off to the power aspects), quality of service parameters 
such as latency, throughput etc. For formal classification, 
particular timing aspects may stay in the “limbo” between 
functional and extra-functional dimensions when timing 
properties are indivisible with the functionality for the real-
time systems (e.g. demanding a worst-case execution time) 
[32] or time-constrained communication implementations as 
in the Network-on-Chip (NoC) structures [37], [38].   
Several works have been widely studying system’s timing 
properties. Some researchers are mainly focused on generating 
timing properties such as Real Time (RT), latency, execution 
time, throughput, communication time, performance and etc., 
to reduce the verification process, state space and cost [40], 
[42], [53]. Other works instead use the timing properties to 
assess whether the system under verification is correctly 
functioning or not [41], [50], [52]. In [42] a framework has 
been developed to analyze performance of a system design. 
The framework is based on stochastic modeling and 
simulation and it is applied on a set of NoC topologies. The 
methodology uses the selective abstraction concept to reduce 
complexity. [53] introduces a tool called CONTREX to 
complement current activities in the area of predictable 
computing platforms and segregation mechanisms with 
techniques to compute RT properties. CONTREX enables 
energy efficient and cost aware design through analysis and 
optimization of properties such as RT.  In [41], an analysis tool 
is developed to work with the AADL [65] developing 
environment to analyze the latency of the AADL model to 
assure the correctness of a scheduling model that binds the 
relation of different components in a model. The authors in 
[50] modified EASTADL [66] to include energy constraints 
and transformed energy-aware real-time (ERT) behaviors 
modeled in EAST-ADL/Stateflow into UPPAAL models 
amenable to formal verification. And finally, in [52] a 
platform has been developed to generate a virtual platform in 
SystemC to express the accuracy of real-time embedded 
system.  
A few works also take into account dependencies between 
several extra-functional aspects. For instance, the work in 
[50], [53] and [42] present the effect of optimizing timing 
properties (performance and latency) on power consumption 
or the study in [52] performs the effect of decreasing execution 
time on power consumption. Such analysis is mostly limited 
to two extra functional aspects or neglected at all [39], [40], 
[41], [55], while design timing constraints can strongly 
influence not only power consumption but reliability, security, 
availability, etc. as well as functional properties.   
D. Power consumption     
 This extra-functional aspect has a tight relation to the 
implementation technology assumed for the synthesis of the 
design model under verification. With planar bulk MOSFET 
technology known for exponential growth of the static leakage 
power for smaller device geometries and employment of 
FinFET and Tri-Gate-Transistors in the advanced technology 
nodes, the CMOS device parameters are essential for this 
analysis [45]. 
In commercial flows, this verification dimension can be 
addressed relatively independently from the functional 
verification dimension. The power intent and detailed power 
modelling can be done starting at TLM or RTL with minimal 
interference with the HDL functional description, e.g. using 
the Accellera introduced Unified Power Format (UPF) 
employed for power-aware design verification automation by 
commercial tools especially with the latest UPF3.0 [48] or 
Cadence/Si2 Common Power Format CPF [49]. For the 
advanced device implementation technologies, power 
specification implies multi-voltage design with up to tens of 
power domains and may consider dynamic and adaptive 
voltage scaling.  
 In the recent research works, design verification against 
the power aspect is performed at different abstraction levels 
with a trade-off between speed and accuracy. Some works 
such as [46], [47], [61], [62] perform power analysis at system 
level targeting high simulation speed and low power 
optimization flexibility similar to the accuracy achievable at 
lower levels. In [46], the authors applied their approach to 
SRAM and AES encryption IPs and obtained a significant 
simulation speed-up in comparison to gate-level simulation 
with a high fidelity of the system-level power simulation. A 
promising software tool for power simulation in SystemC 
designs is the Powersim framework [47], [62]. In [47], a 
methodology to estimate the dissipation of energy in hardware 
at any level of abstraction is proposed. In [62], the authors 
propose a SystemC class library aimed at calculation of energy 
consumption of hardware described at system level. The work 
in [60] introduces a series of tools which can be tightly linked 
and enable the power analysis from layout, gate-level, RT-
level, IP-level to system level. The power aspect verification 
could benefit from a holistic multi-level modelling, such as e.g.  
[17] available for functional verification. [42], [43], [44], [50], 
[52], [53], are aimed at methodologies suitable for specific 
applications (such as cyber-physical system [50]) that assume 
verification of extra-functional aspects such as power, timing, 
thermal at the system level.  
 IV.  THE CHALLENGE OF MULTIDIMENSIONAL 
VERIFICATION  
The performed analysis of the state of the art has outlined 
a gap in methodologies and tools for holistic multidimensional 
verification of hardware design models.  
Different from functional verification, approaches for 
extra-functional hardware design aspects’ verification remain 
underdeveloped even when tackled in isolation. Here, one of 
the key issues is a lack of established metrics for verification 
confidence. For a particular functional verification plan, the 
functional dimension usually includes conventional structural 
(code) coverage metrics, functional coverage [3] in form of 
asserted and assumed properties and design parameters along 
with stimuli quality assessment by model mutations [18]. The 
metrics for confidence in extra-functional dimension 
verification results may be challenging as in practice the 
requirements are subjective and can be specified as a mixture 
of quantitative and qualitative constraints. Accurate hardware 
verification in a particular dimension requires both sufficient 
extra-functional design modeling and the extra-functional 
aspect target modeling [70]. There is a limited number of 
dedicated commercial tools and common standards for extra-
functional verification flows. In particular, for the security 
dimension the JasperGold SPV [71] is one of the few such 
tools that stand out from the academic research frameworks. 
Finally, the issue of eliciting the extra-functional requirements 
[4], [5] is a challenging task as ambiguity and (sometimes 
conflicting) interdependency of the extra-functional aspects in 
the specifications increases complexity and may leave gaps in 
the multidimensional verification plans.  
Unfortunately, there is no established hardware design 
methodology supporting multidimensional verification plans 
for mutually influencing functional and extra-functional 
aspects. There is a very limited number of research works 
going beyond analysis of one extra-functional verification 
aspect under constraints of another as the complexity of the 
problem grows extremely fast with the number of dimensions 
(interdependent constraints) and the electronic system size. 
The first works in this direction are, for example, [44] and 
[70].   
 The objective for the research community is to manage 
multidimensional verification campaigns as illustrated in 
Fig.2. Fig. 2a is an illustration of six independent verification 
campaigns in a three-dimensional verification space. Here, a 
verification campaign can achieve a level of confidence in one, 
two or all dimensions - (F)unctionality, (P)ower and 
(S)ecurity. Radar-charts are an instrument for summarizing 
multidimensional verification results for unlimited number of 
dimensions, see Fig. 2b (where the dimensions can be ordered 
to emphasize correlation or interdependencies between 
adjacent dimensions).  
A. Motivational Example 
Single-dimension verification campaigns ignoring 
interdependencies between the dimensions may lead to gaps 
in the overall electronic system quality. As an example, let us 
consider an actual verification campaign of an open-source 
NoC framework Bonfire [57], [58].  
The design under verification is in RTL VHDL and 
implements a 2x2 NoC infrastructure (processing elements 
excluded). The verification plan considered 2-dimensional 
verification campaign targeting functionality and power 
consumption requirements. For the former, assertion-based 
functional verification by simulation was employed targeting 
statement, branch, condition and toggle coverage metrics and 
satisfaction of a set of temporal simple-subset PSL assertions. 
For the latter, a set of power targets were extracted for the 
targeted silicon implementation assuming a predetermined 
switching activity.  
Among documented design errors, the bug f1, as shown in 
Fig. 3, is an example of a functional misbehavior due to 
improper usage of write and read pointers in the FIFO. The 
bug p1 as shown in Fig. 4, causes violations of specified power 
consumption targets because of unnecessary excessive use of 
a fault-tolerance structure related counter. Interestingly, 
functionality of both the router core and the complete system 
is not interfered in case of p1.  
Table II summarizes power consumption for the three 
cases.  Here, the Total Power is composed of the dynamic 
power, i.e. the Switching Power in the interconnects and the 
Internal Power in the logic cells, and the insignificant (for the 
target technology) static leakage power Leak Power. The case 
p1 results in double power consumption compared to the 
correct implementation and violates the power targets in the 
specification, whereas the power consumption for the f1 case 
remains within the specification. Design verification in a 
single dimension may lead to a faulty design.  
process(write_en, write_pointer) begin --write pointer bug 
  if write_en = '1' then 
  write_pointer_in <= write_pointer(0)&write_pointer(3 downto 1); 
  else 
    write_pointer_in <= write_pointer; 
  end if; 
end process; 
 
process(read_en, empty, read_pointer) begin --read pointer bug 
  if (read_en = '1' and empty = '0') then 
    read_pointer_in <= read_pointer(0)&read_pointer(3 downto 1); 
  else 
    read_pointer_in <= read_pointer; 
  end if; 
end process; 
 
process(write_en, write_pointer )begin --write pointer 
  if write_en = '1' then 
  write_pointer_in <= write_pointer(2 downto 0)&write_pointer(3); 
  else 
    write_pointer_in <= write_pointer; 
end if; 
end process; 
 
process(read_en, empty, read_pointer) begin --read pointer 
  if (read_en = '1' and empty = '0') then 
    read_pointer_in <= read_pointer(2 downto 0)&read_pointer(3); 
  else 
    read_pointer_in <= read_pointer; 
  end if; 
end process; 
Fig. 3. Bug f1 and its correction.  
Fig. 2. Multidimensional verification campaigns  
(Radar-chart n-dimensional visualization) 
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 process(Healthy_packet, reset_counters, healthy_counter_out) 
begin 
  if reset_counters  = '1' then  
      healthy_counter_in <=  (others => '0'); 
  elsif Healthy_packet = '1' then   -- Bug p1! 
      healthy_counter_in <= healthy_counter_out + 1; 
  else 
      healthy_counter_in <= healthy_counter_out; 
  end if; 
end process; 
 
process(Healthy_packet, reset_counters, healthy_counter_out,
 faulty_counter_out) begin 
  if reset_counters  = '1' then  
      healthy_counter_in <=  (others => '0'); 
  elsif Healthy_packet = '1' and faulty_counter_out /= 
std_logic_vector(to_unsigned(0, faulty_counter_out'length)) then  
      healthy_counter_in <= healthy_counter_out + 1; 
  else 
      healthy_counter_in <= healthy_counter_out; 
  end if; 
end process; 
Fig. 4. Bug p1 and its correction.  
TABLE II. POWER CONSUMPTION OF THE CORRECTED BONFIRE SYSTEM 
IMPLEMENTATION AND THE ONE IN PRESENCE OF BUGS F1 AND P1.  
Bonfire system  
Implementation 
Switching 
Power (mW) 
Internal 
Power (mW) 
Leak Power 
(pW) 
Total Power 
(mW)
with f1 bug 0.783 9.427 7.50e+05 10.211
with p1 bug 0.757    21.379 6.93e+05 22.137
corrected  0.666 9.518 7.43e+05 10.184
V. CONCLUSION 
In the recent years, numerous extra-functional aspects of 
electronic systems were brought to the front and imply 
verification of hardware design models in multidimensional 
space along with the functional concerns of the target system.  
In this paper, we have presented a taxonomy for 
multidimensional hardware verification aspects, a state-of-
the-art survey of related research works and trends towards the 
multidimensional verification concept. The performed 
analysis of the state of the art has outlined a gap in 
methodologies and tools for holistic multidimensional 
verification of hardware design models. The concept was also 
motivated by a case study for the functional and power 
verification dimensions. 
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